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Legal Design of Smart Rules and 
Regimes: Regulating Innovation 
Michiel A. Heldeweg 
 
Getting legislation right is essential if we are to deliver the 
ambitious objectives for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, set out by the Europe 2020 Strategy 
European Commission (2010) 
 
There are no easy routes to regulatory improvement. 
Robert Baldwin (2005) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of ‘smart rules and regimes’ aims to focus attention on 
legal instruments that foster technological innovation while providing 
safeguards against technological risks. 
The leading question of this contribution is why smart rules and 
regimes are relevant to policies fostering innovation and how they may 
be the object of a legal design methodology. The main objective of this 
effort is to emphasize that there is more to fostering innovation than 
deregulation, and to elucidate possible avenues for further research into 
legal design of relevant rules and regimes. 
Firstly, I will present a (Dutch-based) viewpoint on the ‘innovation– 
regulation’ relationship (section 3.2). Next I aim to provide clarification 
(in section 3.3) on the concept of ‘smart rules and regimes’, 
especially in relation to technological innovation. Subsequently, some 
ideas are presented (in section 3.4) on a possible legal design methodology 
towards the making of ‘smart rules and regimes’. Finally, I will 
draw some conclusions and make suggestions for further research (in 
section 3.5). 
 
3.2 The ‘Dutch (innovation) paradox’ 
 
In my inaugural lecture on smart rules and regimes (Heldeweg, 2010), 
OECD comments (OECD, 2006) on the ‘Dutch Paradox’ concerning 
innovation in the Netherlands underpinned the relevance of adequate 
regulation for enhancing technological innovation. The findings of the 
OECD may be summarised by the following quote: 
‘An excellent record in knowledge creation, but a mediocre record in 
innovation activity’ – with ‘innovation activity’ being defined as, ‘… 
successful development and application of new knowledge in a new 
product and/or process’. 
 
Innovation 
The OECD survey prompted a study by the Dutch Scientific Council for 
Government Policy (WRR)1 called Innovation Renewed (WRR, 2008). The 
leading question in this WRR report is how government policies may 
improve Dutch innovation-capacity (WRR, 2008: 20). Innovation is 
regarded as a concept embracing both a process and its results in terms of 
a new functionality or a new way of using an existing functionality, both 
in the private and the public sector. Thus it is a ‘complex system’, which 
is not only about creating new knowledge and new technologies, but 
also about changes in organisation, management and labour, towards 
faster recognition, diffusion and application of (new) knowledge (WRR, 
2008: 18). Innovation is not only about exploration (esp. inventions) but 
also about exploitation (esp. valourisation of new knowledge and of new 
technologies). The latter, however, seems to be problematic, also due to 
a shortfall in ‘entrepreneurship’. 
 
Failure at and in innovation 
This shortfall may be linked to various forms of market failure concerning 
innovation. Major causes of this are: reluctance to initiate 
innovation with positive external effects, uncertainty on returns on 
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investment, insufficient or slow knowledge transfer, small profit margins 
(‘lack of slack’), and insufficient cooperation between firms (WRR, 2008: 
58, 83). 
Next to market failure, there is ‘systemic failure’ within the innovation 
process itself (WRR, 2008: 55). A successful exploitation of new 
technology requires institutional changes within markets, such as new 
production and distribution chains, (accompanying) technical standards 
and safety protocols. Existing institutions, however, may impede 
innovation, for instance when a new product fails to pass a safety test 
(for introduction into the market) because its test criteria are based in 
existing technology. 
 
Government opportunities 
Government may have the potential to rectify market and systemic 
innovation failure. Technological innovation is a public interest, 
especially in view of global competition, sustainable development 
and the improvement of public services, such as energy, transport, 
health care and infrastructures (WRR, 2008: 29, 58). Taken intrinsically, 
government will focus on securing innovation as such, through 
securing or improving the ‘general rules of the innovation game’2 
rather than on any particular technology or related public service. 
Taken extrinsically, government interventions are geared by the promise 
of a particular technology to either function as a ‘breakthrough’ or 
‘general purpose technology’ (e.g. electricity, chemistry, electronics, 
computers and the Internet),3 or as a means to improve the quality 
or efficiency of specific public interests (e.g. energy, public transport, 
health care). Extrinsic attention may lead government to act as a 
leading or launching costumer, or as an initiator, a partner in Public- 
Private-Partnerships (PPP), a principal in innovative public procurement, 
and as legislator. 
 
More failure 
With regard to fostering innovation, government should operate on 
the basis of the ‘additionality-principle’. It should intervene only when 
and where necessary (i.e. when markets and social networks fail at 
innovation), and must retreat as soon as possible (WRR, 2008: 31–2). 
Furthermore, involvement of private parties or indeed privatisation 
may be an important tool in the formulation and execution of public 
interest innovation policy. 
The additionality-principle ‘responds’ primarily to the dangers of 
‘government failure’ relating to innovation. The main examples of 
this are: lack of scientific knowledge (causing vulnerability to either 
misjudgements or to ‘regulatory capture’); fragmentation of government 
innovation policies (resulting from bureaucratic divisions and 
struggles);4 over-specificity in its requirements on deliverables (in terms 
of timeliness, technical standards, the requirement of universal access – 
linked to subsidies or procurement – especially when innovation is still 
immature); and finally, over-regulation, administrative burdens, and 
inadequate fiscal and socio-economic policies. 
 
A smart approach? 
Clearly (apart from over-regulation) ‘dumb regulation’ must be avoided; 
especially technology-dependent regulation (Van Klink and Prins, 2002: 
37–8). Such may be the case in rules on market admittance of substances 
and products, in normalisation within production and distribution 
chains and networks, in subsidy systems or public procurement strategies, 
and in regulatory prohibitions which aim to safeguard (especially) 
the environment, public health and public safety. 
 
Still, avoiding ‘dumb regulation’ does not cover the full spectrum of 
legal strategies that ‘smart rules and regimes’ may provide. A broader and 
more systematic perspective is necessary. With smart rules and regimes 
in mind, we may relate to Roger Brownsword’s three types of channelling 
conduct ‘x’ (Brownsword, 2008: 19–21). He distinguishes negative 
channelling (‘So that agents shall not do x’; presupposing ‘a rule that 
prohibits x’), positive channelling (‘So that agents shall do x’; presupposing 
‘a rule that requires x’) and neutral channelling (‘So agents may 
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or may not do x’ – as they prefer; requiring ‘a rule that permits x’). We 
may substitute ‘conduct x’ with any particular kind of technological 
innovation (as applying ‘technology x’) and similarly channel the regulatory 
take on this particular kind of innovation as follows: 
 
Table 3.1 Regulatory channelling of innovation (cfrm. Brownsword) 
Type of channelling Description of 
conduct 
Typical norm of 
conduct 
Negative ‘Shall not do 
Innovation x’   
Prohibition 
Neutral ‘May (not) do 
Innovation x’   
Permission 
Positive ‘Shall do 
Innovation x’   
Requirement 
 
 
Brownsword adds four comments to this threefold ‘regulatory range’. 
Firstly, that a ‘negative channelling’ (i.e. prohibition) leaves open the 
decision on modes of enforcement (penal sanctions, tort or administrative 
redress).5 Secondly, that ‘neutral channelling’ (i.e. conduct being 
permitted) leaves open whether this comes with ‘reservations’ (‘permission 
with negative reservation’) or with encouragement (‘permission 
with facilitation’). Thirdly, that in the absence of a blanket prohibition 
or unvarnished permission, we are likely to find a regulatory mix of 
public and private law rules. Fourth and finally, that regulation will 
hold a ‘default position’, called regulatory tilt, which projects a normative 
guideline if regulatory ambiguities need to be resolved or when 
regulation is silent on a point. In these cases the default position will 
either indicate prohibition or permission – ambiguity is resolved and 
silence interpreted assuming the tilt to be either against permission or 
against prohibition. 
 
Clearly, this approach presents different avenues in which smart rules 
and regimes may be employed, with a view on fostering technological 
innovation, and will be of interest to a legal design methodology. 
This calls for a further analysis of these three options, set out below, in 
which conduct towards ‘x’ may be understood as conduct favourable to 
technological innovation (the norm-object), and ‘y’ depicts the agent(s) 
addressed (the norm-subject). 
 
‘Prohibitive’. In the prohibitive (‘y shall not do x’) perspective, the 
focus is on risk regulation: ‘regulating technological risk’ (Fisher, 2010: 
6, 7), that is, the regulatory safeguarding of public interests in a clean 
environment, public health and public safety, against (outside) threats – 
prohibitions, but also ‘permissions with negative reservations’. This focus, 
however, must come with a view on how, while curbing or channelling 
exploration and exploitation of technology, risk regulation can meanwhile 
accommodate technological innovation. 
This approach we name: ‘innovative risk regulation’. In fostering 
innovation, the choice and design of regulatory restrictions should 
reflect innovation-efficiency and innovation-effectiveness. 
Innovation-efficiency is about avoiding over-inclusiveness of norms: 
prohibiting more than is necessary to protect vulnerable interests. 
Targetedness of the regulated conduct is necessary to avoid such overinclusiveness 
(i.e. inefficiency). Detailed regulation may be the answer, but 
often comes with technical specificities that make restrictions vulnerable 
to technological innovation the aforementioned problem of technologydependency. 
Innovation-effectiveness is about promoting more desirable innovations 
by placing restrictions on existing or emerging technologies. Such 
restrictions could operate as a push towards a technological shift to a 
new or improved technological functionality. A mere prohibition (of certain 
technologies) may (similar to a command – e.g. of emission targets) 
promote innovation, if industry has sufficient (financial) resources and 
time to make necessary alternative investments, and if a level (competitive) 
playing field is safeguarded. A ‘(smart) regulatory mix’, for example, 
may add an encouraging pull (the proverbial ‘carrot’) to the compelling 
push (the proverbial ‘stick’) such as by combining restrictions with subsidies 
or tax exemptions for first movers. In effect this shifts the regulatory 
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response from ‘negative’ towards ‘neutral’ channelling. 
‘Permissive’. In a permissive (‘y may or may not do x’) perspective, 
our focus lies with creating favourable regulatory conditions towards 
enhancing technological innovation as a matter of private choice. We 
name this: ‘innovation-facilitating regulation’. 
‘Permission with positive facilitation’ would clearly fall into this 
category, but also, for example, creating a zone in which private actors 
‘may’ and ‘can’ indeed (legally) pursue certain innovations, more 
restricted elsewhere. 
The baseline of facilitation is to ensure the presence of a legal infrastructure 
favourable to technology innovation; based on public interest 
considerations but geared to foster private interests, so that private actors 
may act upon expected private ‘gains’. A robust and attractive system 
of property rights (including intellectual property), sound and versatile 
contract and competition law, as well as trustworthy regimes for recognition 
of specialised knowledge, skills and performance (e.g. diplomas and 
certification) are essential. 
In addition and more conducive (as ‘pull’), some specific legal 
arrangements, innovation enticing, could provide interesting steppingstones 
towards innovation, such as: tradable public rights (e.g. emission 
allowances), legal grants (e.g. subsidies, favourable loans and securities), 
(re)allocation of property rights (e.g. removing ‘anti-commons’ barriers – 
Heller, 1998), and regulatory competition (Tiebout, 1956). 
 
‘Compelling’. In a compelling (‘y shall do x’) perspective, innovation 
is a public interest that warrants active persuasion, through regulation 
that obliges innovative conduct. We name this: ‘innovation-compelling 
regulation’. 
Following four types of regulation,6 this compelling regulatory perspective 
presents itself in many different examples. Firstly, through direct regulation, 
where conduct follows ‘command and control’ and breaches are 
punishable under law, which features prohibitions and commands aimed 
at shifting from existing undesirable technologies to new and promising 
technologies. Secondly, through indirect regulation, where conduct 
follows efficiency considerations and is sanctioned by – comparative – 
economic disadvantage, such as by taxation (or by tort law).7 Thirdly, 
through self-regulation, where conduct follows social considerations and 
is sanctioned by criticism and ostracism. Examples of compelling self regulation 
generally require that self-regulation transforms into intermediary 
regulation, in which regulation results from cooperation, such as 
where government (or a third party) operates as initiator or matchmaker. 
Public and/or private initiatives towards certification of products, services, 
processes and organisations (as a prerequisite to a go-ahead), are important 
examples. Operating as a launching (or leading) customer will require 
proper schemes of innovative procurement or schemes towards publicprivate 
partnerships. Furthermore, ‘quangos’ (i.e. independent regulators) 
or social enterprises (e.g. housing corporations, health care providers and 
universities) may be the intermediaries that initiate innovative projects (on 
the basis of a regulatory framework provided by government). Fourthly, 
the use of inherent regulation, where conduct follows inbuilt or systemic 
constraints of functionalities,8 sanctioned by absence or loss of (physical) 
functionality. These may present themselves – compellingly – through the 
need to apply (or keep up with changes in) state of the art technology to 
(optimally) make use of a functionality. A low-tech example is the ‘speed 
ramp’, while a high-tech example is adherence to internet protocols in 
providing and using ICT-services. 
 
Balancing act 
Clearly, this regulatory range indicates the balancing act that is needed. 
Not only must technological innovation be fostered, but there is also 
the public interest of securing against technological risks. Ideally 
both interests must be acted upon jointly, indifferent to whether the 
initiative to act lies with fostering innovation or curbing risks. 
Thus, there is an abundance of reasons to look more closely at 
what can be done to design regulation that can cope with the challenges, 
which the aforementioned balancing act presents us with. 
Consequently, focusing on the possibilities of designing ‘smart rules 
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and regimes’ seems a sensible next step. 
3.3 The concept of ‘smart rules and regimes’ 
Conceptualising ‘smart rules and regimes’ focuses attention on legal forms 
of regulation and the general normative context that underpins and constraints 
their validity and bindingness. First, the concepts of ‘rules’ and of 
‘regimes’ must be defined, preferably in simple and yet robust terms. 
 
Rules are defined as linguistic statements, projecting a mode of conduct 
or a power conferred, which is prescribed or attributed (bindingly)9 
in instances as defined within the rule (or its underpinning rules). In 
general, rules consist of: a ‘subject’, that is, the person(s) prescriptively 
addressed – subject ‘y’ in: ‘y shall/may or can (not) do x’; an ‘object’, 
that is, the conduct prescribed – conduct ‘x’ in: ‘y shall/may or can (not) 
do x’; an operative mode, that is, the prescriptive modality – prescribing 
‘shall/may’ or ‘can’ in: ‘y shall/may or can (not) do x’; a ‘norm-condition’ 
(‘z’ in: ‘y shall/may or can (not) do x, if and when z’) (Ruiter, 2010). 
 
A regime is defined as a system of (such) rules, which in conjunction 
includes not only norms, but also the mechanisms of decision making 
and the network of involved actors.10 A regime holds at least the 
minimum of objective legal norms necessary to underpin subjective 
legal relations, such as in a permit or a subsidy scheme, and in (general) 
contract and property law. Some regimes are abstract (i.e. of general 
applicability – e.g. contract and property law), and some concrete (i.e. 
related to a specific interest – e.g. an environmental permit system or 
indeed an environmental law code). 
 
Wicked problems, smart response 
I name rules and regimes smart, in as much as they are more successful 
in adequately addressing the need for legal regulation in complex 
circumstances of: 
• high societal or technological dynamics, which present a desire for 
adaptable (or self-adaptive) (systems of) legal norms which dynamically 
enshrine new/improved knowledge (technological innovation) 
or new/changed opinions/values (social innovation – often following 
technological innovation); 
• major contrasts or rather conflicts of interests, presenting (more) fundamental 
differences in (opinions following underlying) values, which 
present a desire for (systems of) legal norms, which may mediate 
tensions between these values, such as between public and private 
interests, or between opportunity and risk. 
 
A combination of these two circumstances – high dynamics and major 
conflict – presents a ‘wicked (regulatory) problem’ (comp. Rittel and 
Webber, 1973), such as is manifest in debates on technological innovation 
and the likelihood, magnitude and distribution of their risks and 
benefits. Clearly, these problems pose a challenge to regulatory governance, 
11 that is, to the design of smart rules and regimes, aimed at 
balancing both dynamics and conflicts. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Positioning Smart Rules & Regimes 
Dynamics (effective and efficient) 
è 
societal technological 
Conflict ê (legitimate &legal 
validity) 
- + + - 
Private ó Public 
 
- -/- -/+ -/+ -/- 
+ +/- Smart rules & 
regimes 
+/+ 
+/- 
Risk ó 
Opportunity 
+ +/- +/- 
- -/- -/+ -/+ -/- 
A ‘+’ or ‘-’ points at presence or absence of a confict or of dynamics  
 
As to definitions, the concept of smart rules and regimes is not coined 
to delineate sharply between, smartness and dumbness, but primarily to 
express the ambition to overcome wicked regulatory challenges. 
Smart rules and regimes are clearly relevant in two exemplary cases. 
Firstly, when fostering services of societal interest, there is a need to 
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balance public and private interests in these services, in the context of 
dynamic changes in (primarily) political opinion (and/or in commercial 
strategies), on how and which services need be rendered. Secondly, 
when fostering technological innovation of societal interest, especially 
balancing advantages and risks of innovation, in the context of a 
context of dynamic changes in (primarily) technology (and society).12 
Table 3.2 shows how smart rules and regimes may thus be positioned – 
the references to legitimacy, legal validity, effectiveness and efficiency 
will be clarified below). 
In this contribution the focus is on fostering technological innovation, 
with a view on (a) strong dynamics (i.e. a stress on robustness 
and on adaptability) and on (b) avoiding unacceptable risks. Clearly, 
this touches upon the challenge addressed by, among others, Somsen 
(Somsen, 2009: 21 – translated by MAH): 
 
The continuous safeguarding of the topicality of a regulatory regime, 
measured by the current state of technology, is the greatest and 
seemingly most hopeless challenge of technology regulation. […] 
Effective regulation presupposes a procedural and institutional facility 
which facilitates a simple and fast adaptability of the regulatory 
regime to new technological factuality. 
 
In this contribution, smart rules and regimes are discussed in terms of 
their ability to provide such an ‘institutional facility’. 
 
Variables and maxims 
The smartness of rules and regimes relates to balancing two variables: 
high dynamics and strong conflicts of interests. This reflects underlying 
legal governance dimensions and accompanying principles or maxims 
of regulatory effectiveness and efficiency (under dynamic pressure) and 
regulatory legitimacy and legal validity (under pressure of conflicting 
interests). Clearly, the challenge, as described by Somsen, illustrates this. 
If legal norms do not ‘align’ with the current state of technology, they 
stand to become either (obsolete, hence) ineffective (i.e. inadequate in 
protecting against risks) and/or (obstacles, hence) inefficient (i.e. unnecessarily 
hampering the deployment of new technologies). Making these 
norms more adaptive to technological change may, however, put stress 
upon their legitimacy (e.g. through involving private rule making) or 
their legal validity (e.g. through discretionary overstretch in executive 
use or court interpretation). 
Consequently, the design of smart rules and regimes must rest upon 
guidelines, which do justice to these legal governance dimensions 
and accompanying principles of good legal governance. These principles 
reflect both the requirements of the rule of law (as legal norms 
adherence – safeguarding freedom and fairness between government 
and citizens and among citizens reciprocally) and of serving the public 
interest (as governance optimality – ensuring that public interests 
be served properly and balanced). The latter (‘proper public service’) 
should lead to the design of effective and efficient regulatory strategies; 
the former (‘fairness through the rule of law’) to the design of legitimate 
and legally valid rules and regimes. 
In this day and age, the term ‘regulatory governance’ points at the 
(vertical, horizontal and perhaps diagonal)13 diffusion of regulatory 
power, following the postulate of legal pluralism, instead of the classic 
liberal legal underpinning (Scott, 2010). Within this context the regulatory 
governance debate especially addresses: ‘the tensions between 
effective and instrumental regulatory governance, on the one hand, and 
demands for accountability and respect for process and rights within 
constitutionalism on the other.’ (Ibid.). 
 
Four dimensions, four principles 
In keeping with this perspective, I proposed (Heldeweg, 2010) that the 
smartness of rules and regimes comprises a cumulative judgment on the 
aforementioned four counts, which I will now clarify. 
 
Legitimacy is about ‘which particular regulatory interventions can 
legally be brought about by who?’ Its focus is on the id quod dimension 
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(as opposed to modus quo – in legal validity) of the regulatory power to 
(unilaterally) bind others. Governmental legal acts are a major example. 
In the public law appraisal of state and government powers, legitimacy 
is the prime issue, as it delineates the demarcation between state power 
and citizens freedom(s). The issue, however, stretches beyond the context 
of government hierarchy (featuring binding government transactions). 
Other relevant archetypical ‘institutional environments’ of regulatory 
activity, are markets (featuring competition-based transactions) and 
social networks (featuring collaborative transactions – public or private).14 
Each environment brings its own underpinning of legitimacy, pointedly 
described in terms of ‘voice’ (democratic legitimation of government), 
‘exit’ (demand shifting to another supplier) and ‘loyalty’ (reciprocal willingness 
to cooperate).15 As serving public interests may be left to (or be 
strongly influenced by) private actors, alternative institutional environments 
with their particular demands on legitimacy will likewise be relevant 
to the smartness of rules and regimes that shape and operate within 
these environments and the alignment of structures of governance and 
accompanying transactions (Van Genugten, 2008; Scott, 2010). 
Legitimacy should be understood primarily in legal terms, as the legal 
power or competence to bind others legally or de facto, especially unilaterally. 
Even for government this will stretch beyond the concept of legality; 
in general ‘legal authority under the rule of law’ seems more fitting.16 
In the context of technological innovation ‘legitimacy’ is the dimension 
determining which agents can authoritatively decide on the 
introduction and use of new technologies – either by governments (by 
democratic mandate), by markets (by consumers preferences), by social 
networks (by consent) or by some hybrid mix of these (all of the aforementioned?), 
either in public or private law legal forms or concepts. 
 
Legal validity is about ‘how a particular regulatory intervention may/ 
shall or can legally be brought about?’ It focuses on the modus quo 
dimension of regulation in terms of the availability (and proper use) of 
regulatory legal tools (e.g. legislation, contracts and permits), respect 
for higher (written or unwritten) legal norms, and applicability of legal 
controls (i.e. enforceability and legal protection). 
The full merit of ‘legal validity’ is realised only if and when we not 
only consider lawfulness in terms of (likeliness of) passing the test of 
judicial review by a court of law,17 but also, as a matter of (publicly 
debatable) ‘justice’, as in congruency with leading legal concepts and 
principles, such as ‘distributive justice’ and ‘openness’ or transparency’ 
(apart from possibilities for a judicial test). 
In the context of technological innovation this is the dimension 
where, in particular, the distribution of risks and benefits of innovation 
will be tested. 
 
Effectiveness is about ‘what particular regulatory intervention can 
practically be brought about?’ It focuses on whether a rule or regime can 
result in intended (changes of) conduct. Effectiveness is served when 
rules and regimes adequately fulfil their functional potential to bring 
about the kind of conduct and/or activities, which is or are deemed 
beneficial to the particular public interest. With regard to individual 
norms, the following elements are of (major) importance in ensuring 
that a rule/regime adequately depicts and prescribes the desired kind of 
(pattern of) behaviour: 
 
1. choosing the proper ‘norm operator’ – projecting the normative mode 
in terms of shall/may (not) or can, fitting to the desired conduct or 
power; 
2. choosing the proper ‘norm object’ – projecting the conduct or 
empowerment as a proxy that is most in keeping with the relevant 
public interest (certainly not under-inclusive and, if possible, 
conducive);18,19 
3. choosing the proper ‘norm conditionality’ – determining whether or 
not the norm is of a categorical or a hypothetical normative mode;20 
4. choosing the proper ‘norm subject(s)’ – that is, addressing the proper 
agents (individual or general). Not only should a purposive fit of 
norms to public interests be ensured, but (unintended and) undesirable 
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side effects (to the intended or adjacent public interests) must 
be avoided.21 
 
Furthermore, fostering effectiveness requires ensuring, on a regime or 
system level, ‘external coherence’ or systemic effectiveness; avoiding a 
clash with other norms resulting in a conflicting prescription of conduct 
(conflicting requirements); ensuring certainty (measurability of 
adherence) and credibility of enforcement (and legal protection). 
Relating specifically to technological innovation, dynamic appropriateness 
must be ensured, safeguarding both robustness through adaptability 
(of content, interpretation or application) thus avoiding under-inclusiveness. 
The latter is especially relevant to the effectiveness of rules and 
regimes in the context of technological innovation and, in a way, is 
similar to a smart bomb’s capability to adjust to a moving target so as to 
hit a target at least as good as when the target were motionless. 
 
Efficiency is about ‘how a particular regulatory intervention can practically 
be brought about?’ It is concerned, firstly, with whether regulating 
is a ‘cost-effective’ policy effort to create presumably effective rules or 
regimes (as policy output). Secondly, it addresses the ‘cost-effectiveness’ 
of the rule or regime (as resulting from the regulatory effort) as regards 
the impact on the regulated conduct (as policy outcomes). 
The output efficiency hinges on the relative regulator’s costs concerning 
creation and management of regulation (including informing, 
enforcing and protecting). The regulator should aim to choose (types 
of) rules and regimes which (by comparison) incur the least regulatory 
management costs to the regulator (e.g. general rules; empowerment of 
norm-addressees to enforce among themselves; building upon existing 
rules and regimes). 
The outcome efficiency depends on the relative behaviour adjustment 
costs of the regulatees (i.e. norm-addressees); for example, administrative 
burden, (profit) losses – some temporary, some structural. 
The regulator should choose those (types of) rules and regimes, which 
cause (by comparison) the least regulatory or administrative burden on 
regulatees, by avoiding unnecessary ‘juridification’, over-regulation, 
over-detailed regulation, (over)fragmentation of (property) rights and 
powers (i.e. ‘anti-commons’), and facilitation of self-regulation. On the 
level of individual norms these aspects are ‘captured’ by avoiding overinclusiveness 
through a proper choice of ‘norm object’ (not unnecessarily 
restrictive), of ‘norm conditionality’ (if possible hypothetical), 
‘norm subject(s)’ (no more norm-addressees than necessary) – all of 
which amount especially to targetedness or precision: in ‘smart bomb’ 
terms, avoiding ‘collateral damage’.22 On the level of regimes especially 
‘external coherence’ (avoidance of conflicting requirements; fostering 
complementarities and synergy), but also legal certainty and credibility 
of enforcement (and legal protection) need be ensured. 
Efficiency is here expressed in terms of the least in either regulators’ 
regulatory management costs or regulatees’ behaviour adjustment 
costs – least in a comparison of alternative rules and regimes being 
equal either as purported norms (effectively expressing the desired 
conduct – the regulatory output), or as conduct invoked (effectively 
in conformity with the norms). Efficiency is regarded as a relative (or 
comparative) concept, and is about whether the choice of a specific 
rule or regime comes without unnecessary cost or by comparison with 
the lowest (necessary) costs. ‘Smoothness’ of management or of behaviour 
adjustment – ‘regulatory ergonomics’ – comes with minimising 
the burden inflicted upon regulators and/or regulatees, and maximises 
output- and outcome-efficiency. Note though, that lowering costs as a 
matter of efficiency may (be) extend(ed) to creating or even maximising 
private benefits in alignment with relevant public interests; the 
rules and regimes become more efficient (i.e. more easily manageable or 
adjustable to), but also (and otherwise relevant to both regulators and 
regulatees) (more) profitable, which supports effectiveness.23 
 
From the standpoint of technology innovation ‘dynamic appropriateness’ 
needs to be ensured, safeguarding targetedness through adaptability, 
focused on substantively safeguarding and, where possible, ‘freedom 
from regulation’ or a ‘permissive tilt’, again avoiding over-inclusiveness. 
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This is similar to how a smart traffic light’s adjusts to the absence of 
crossing cars, so as to avoid unnecessary waiting when there is no risk 
of crashing into another car. 
 
In the above, the term ‘smoothness’ was used to describe the efficiency 
maxim in terms of (producing manageable, but especially of) 
creating user-friendly norms (the users being regulatees or normaddressees). 
The term ‘ergonomics’ was coined as possibly more fitting, 
as it expresses the notion of choosing and designing rules and 
regimes which optimally align with (existing) ‘natural’ behaviour or 
governance modes (including relevant (types of) values, preferences, 
incentives and inter-/transaction patterns).24 Thus, regulatory ergonomics 
(or ergonomics of regulatory governance) not only call for a 
lowering of the regulatory burden, but also the efficient allocation of 
obligations and (correlative) property rights (or entitlements). This 
means that the regulatory burden should preferably not be a serious 
impediment upon desired conduct, but insofar as it is, it should preferably 
be a burden only upon norm-addressees for whom it is, by comparison, 
easiest to shift the burden onto others; that is, transfer onto 
others, preferably as a result of a voluntary transaction (Ruiter, 2008). 
Furthermore, regulatory ergonomics are also promoted by clarity and 
simplicity of (systems of) norms, and a responsive/participative style 
of regulation enhances opportunities for rules and regimes to match 
norm- addressees’ ‘ particularities’.25 
 
Again, the ‘how’ of the efficiency dimension is concerned with 
measuring costs or burdens, but especially with comparing alternatives. 
Clearly, greater efficiency may indirectly enhance the effectiveness of 
the rules and regimes involved, as well as benefit legitimacy (if only by 
being less burdensome) and legal validity (since inefficiency may be a 
sign of disproportionality).26 
 
In analysing effectiveness and efficiency we find that some issues are, 
sometimes ‘symmetrically’, relevant to both. The first examples of this 
are ‘precision and targetedness’, and ‘over-regulation’, which relate to 
either over- or under-inclusiveness, amounting to either not reaching 
goals, otherwise harming the featured public interest or harming other 
public interests, or being over restrictive, thus unnecessarily limiting 
freedom and creating an unnecessary regulatory burden on both 
regulators and norm-addressees. 
Another example are the abovementioned regulatory ergonomics, 
which are relevant in terms of enhancing functionality, especially 
through enabling (‘make effective’ – such as through tradable public 
rights) and avoiding transaction costs (‘keep efficient’ – such as through 
avoiding fragmentation and non-alignment with behavioural and 
governance patterns). 
A final example of dual relevancy is the issue of robustness, either 
geared to retaining effectiveness (i.e. adaptability) or efficiency (i.e. 
targetedness). 
 
Name of the game 
Interdependencies between legitimacy, legal validity, effectiveness and 
efficiency, place the ideal of smartness of rules and regimes on a range 
between satisficing and optimising. As satisficing requires meeting minimum 
criteria for each maxim, not allowing any trade-offs; optimising, 
although initially geared towards best performance on each count, does 
also allow for balancing between dimensions or maxims (with respect 
of minimum criteria). Such balancing will not only need to reflect the 
nature of a given public interest and the kind of dynamism and or 
conflict with other interests, but must also relate to the nature of the 
(existing or proposed) ‘institutional environment’, as described in the 
above, of which hierarchy (government), competition (markets) and 
collaboration (social networks) are the archetypical forms.27 
In practice hybridity between these forms, as in the example of a 
commercial enterprise (also) being involved in issuing public law certifications 
for technologically complex industrial installations, is ubiquitous. 
Hence, the evaluation of the smartness of the rules and regimes 
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involved will hinge on whether there is sufficient alignment between 
governance and regulation, in terms of all four indicators. Legitimacy, 
for example, may suffer considerably when a commercial enterprise is 
bestowed with public powers, which in effect (e.g. through certification) 
push out competition – so private interests drive out public interests, or 
hierarchical powers distort the workings of the market. 
 
3.4 The concept of a legal design methodology (towards 
‘smart rules and regimes’) 
Assuming relevance of smart rules and regimes in the face of the fostering 
of technological innovation, we need to consider their legal design. 
 
A methodology of legal design? 
By analogy, examples from industry, fashion and furniture suggest that 
to create ‘legal objects’ on the basis of a design (based in a design methodology) 
makes good sense. According to Ruiter,28 successful examples of 
such designs ‘designate the projection of a type of artefacts with a function 
determining their form’.29 Similarly we may possibly create legal artefacts, 
depicted in their design as a specific form-function relationship, capable 
of performing or fulfilling legal functions.30 Especially rights (transferred 
as if they are objects), obligations (imposed as if they are burdens) and 
powers (conferred as if they are tools) are likely candidates of such legal 
artefacts – as are property, servitude and inheritance (Ruiter, 2010a: 2). 
To arrive truly at a general conceptual framework as a basis for a 
methodology of legal design, which (general guidelines) could operate 
in different areas of law (as smart rules and regimes may ‘operate’ as 
regulatory mixtures across different areas), we should leave behind the 
legal dogmatics of specific areas of law, such as civil or administrative 
law. A promising, more abstract, approach is to use concepts of ‘legal 
theory’, more specifically the theory on ‘legal institutions’ (Ruiter, 
1993; 2001), such as marriage, property rights, corporations and public 
authorities (Ruiter, 2010a: 3–4). 
 
An institutional approach 
Legal institutions depict a normative mode of human behaviour in the 
form of (1) a system of rules (2) projecting a state of affairs (3) that ought 
to be realised (4) by a social practice regulated by those rules and (5) 
expressive of a common belief that the state of affairs is (6) actually the 
case. Element 2 (projecting a state of affairs) readily leads to a classification 
of different legal institutions, projecting: (1) a legal quality; (2) a legal status; 
(3) a personal legal relation; (4) an objective legal relation; (5) a legal 
configuration – and furthermore, (6) (through ‘ personification’) legal subjects 
and (7) (through ‘reification’) legal objects. These basic legal forms, 
delineated as possible legal design objects, may be geared towards providing 
design guidelines, derived from (1) the general features of all legal 
institutions and (2) the specific features of legal institutions of different 
classes (Ruiter, 2010a: 7–10 – also including examples of such guidelines). 
Clearly, such guidelines primarily relate to – by analogy – the ‘drawing 
of the dress’ (i.e. the design of a legal artefact), rather than the 
‘dress made’ (i.e. a specific instance of such legal artefact). Legal design 
is, after all, primarily concerned with conceiving, as concepts, possible 
institutional practices and their corresponding ‘systems of legal norms 
suited to elicit and control such practices’ (Ruiter, 2010b: 4). As such the 
design of concepts of legal artefacts provides the foundation for (guideline- 
based) conceptualisations of individual instances of such artefacts, 
suited to a particular situation. 
 
An internal perspective 
A methodology of legal (institutional) design should primarily consider 
the internal structure of ‘legal institutions as systems of norms’. A major 
focus would be to determine how the ‘constitutive elements’ of such 
legal systems could properly be framed: the legal norms themselves 
(Ruiter, 2010c: 1). A fitting methodology could firstly address rules projecting 
legal norms of conduct and, secondly, rules projecting powerconferring 
norms legal acts. 
 
As to the design of legal norms of conduct (‘x shall/may (not) do 
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y (when Z)’), Ruiter proposes that their design should adhere to the 
following three guidelines:31 
 
1. take into consideration the four basic components of every norm: 
Subject (‘x’), Object (‘y’), Operator (‘shall or may (not)’), and 
Conditions (‘z’);32 
2. decide to which extent the logical oppositions (in variations of ‘shall 
or may (not) do’: command, prohibition, permission and dispensation) 
are relevant determinants of the design; 
3. establish whether the design is such as to generate legal relations (according 
to Hohfeld) of a ‘claim-duty’ or ‘privilege-no-claim’ nature (discriminating 
between different kinds of rights – ‘claims’ and ‘privileges’ – and 
their legal opposites – ‘duties’ and ‘no-claims’), and, if so, whether the 
respective rights holder positions and rights addressee positions are 
properly specified (in terms of unital and multital relations – MAH). 
 
These three guidelines summarise an analysis, which specifies normcomponents 
and presents categorisations of norms, types of rights, and 
rights holders and addressees. 
Framing the norm-components strikes a chord with the above analyses 
of the dimensions of effectiveness and efficiency, especially in terms of 
defining ‘inclusiveness’ (and avoidance of over- and under-inclusiveness) – 
which makes ‘guideline 1.’ especially relevant to smart rules and regimes. 
Combining the positions of the components object and operator, 
yields four basic types of norms of conduct (‘command’, ‘prohibition’, 
‘permission’ and ‘dispensation’) together with their reciprocal 
relations: contradictory, contrary, subaltern or subcontrary. This basic 
understanding is indispensable, for instance, for the concept of a regulatory 
range (channelling conduct) and regulatory tilt, as well as for reasons 
of legal system-consistence (especially relating to effectiveness and efficiency, 
and indirectly to legitimacy and legal validity) – hence we also need 
to take ‘guideline 2.’ into consideration. This is particularly challenging as 
legal language brings with it the ability to express the ‘shall-operator’ in 
terms of the ‘may-operator’ and vice versa. Thus, a command (an ‘ordered 
act’) is the negation of dispensation (the ‘allowance not to act’); prohibition 
(an ‘order not to act’) is the negation of permission (an ‘allowance to 
act’); permission (supra) is the negation of prohibition (supra); and dispensation 
(supra) is the negation of command (supra). Careful consideration 
is clearly of vital importance and must come with reflection on systemic 
aims (such as regulatory tilt) and regime consistency. 
 
Similarly, we may use Wesley N. Hohfeld’s four fundamental types 
of legal rights (‘claim’, ‘privilege’, ‘power’, ‘immunity’), within four 
types of legal relations, as two groups of two types of rights-relations, 
either as relations based in norms of conduct or as relations based in 
norms of competence (to change norms of conduct). As to norms of 
conduct a ‘claim’ has a ‘duty’ as its legal correlative and a ‘privilege’ 
has a ‘no-claim’ position as its correlative. The positions of rights holders 
and rights addressees may be ‘unital’ (one person of closed group) 
or ‘multital’ (an open class of persons), which leads to eight different 
types of (claim – duty and privilege – no-claim) legal relations. Clearly, 
considering earlier remarks on effectiveness and efficiency relation to 
norm-subjects, adherence to ‘guideline 3.’ is called for. 
 
Next to norms of conduct we must consider power-conferring norms, 
or norms of competence, which enable one or more agents to create33 
or abolish legal norms (Ibid. 2000c:1). Such a ‘norm of competence’ 
requires that we introduce, in addition to the norm-operators ‘shall’ 
and ‘may’, a third norm-operator: ‘can’, signifying the ability to bring 
about legal effects especially through the performance of a legal act (e.g. 
legislation, contracting). Empowerment to perform such legal acts must 
come from within the legal order and is met, within that order, by the 
correlative ‘liability’ of others to adhere. 
Similar to norms of conduct (claim and privilege), there is a square of 
rights and (two) legal relations following from norms of competence: 
power, vis-à-vis its correlative liability, and immunity, vis-à-vis its correlative 
no-power). Again, it is relevant to distinguish between (in all 
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eight types of relations based on) unital and multital rights holder and 
rights addressee positions. 
Reflection on (1) norm-components, (2) logical oppositions, and 
(3) types of legal relations is vital to the making of (regimes of) legal 
rules, and the specific nature of norms of competence should be well 
understood. The power to create or abolish legal norms is, of course, 
vital in order to ensure that norms are adaptable in the face of technological 
innovation – apart from other mechanisms, such as changing 
modes of interpretation of abstract terms and conditions. Different 
classes of competence norms may be categorised, underpinning different 
classes of legal acts (Ruiter, 2010d: 9–10). Design guidelines should 
accommodate the making of such different types of norms. 
 
3.5 Conclusions and the way forward 
The leading proposition to this contribution has been that smart rules 
and regimes provide a useful framework towards understanding the 
regulation-innovation relationship, as well as towards the legal design 
of such rules and regimes. 
 
The ideas behind such design, especially as phrased by Ruiter, open 
the perspective of framing smart rules and regimes as legal institutions. 
Clearly, this translates quite readily into possible guidelines concerning 
the internal structure of legal institutions, especially norms of conduct, 
norms of competence and legal acts. Such guidelines may well prove 
indispensable to addressing the question of how some internal structures 
may be smarter than others in terms of the four dimensions (and 
corresponding maxims) as coined in the second paragraph. 
 
In particular, matters of effectiveness and efficiency (dimensions) may 
be addressed on the design level of legal norms by components such as 
the determination of the norm-operator, norm-object, norm-subject and 
norm-condition. Apart from legal consistency, however, an institutional 
perspective on legitimacy and legal validity is less apparent. As much 
as effectiveness and efficiency are relevant to regulating technological 
innovation, so are legitimacy (as in who decides on setting certain standards 
for new technologies) and legal validity (as in safeguarding legal 
certainty as a precondition to investing in innovation). Consequently, 
in terms of legal design, we need a framework or methodology that also 
addresses these two dimensions and accompanying principles. 
 
Internal and external 
At this stage of analysis, we must acknowledge that the focus on the 
internal structure of legal institutions must be matched by a broader 
design scope, encompassing both rules and regimes. Legal institutions 
will often be framed as regimes, forming a conjunction of rules as 
a system, projecting the institution. The internal make-up of such 
regimes – how to frame a conjunction of rules – is a primordial challenge 
to the design of smart regimes.34 Subsequently, the focus on the 
internal structure needs to be matched by an external view on the legal 
consequences of regulatory governance or policy considerations. This 
seems especially relevant as regards legitimacy and legal validity. 
 
The need for such an external perspective, however, is important to all 
dimensions and principles. The regulatory governance considerations and 
proposed strategies which go under the labels of ‘Better Regulation’ (OECD, 
1995 and 2005; EC, 2002, 2005) and ‘Smart Regulation’ (Gunningham 
et al., 1997 and 1998; EC, 2010), seem proper ‘illustrations’ of the impetus, 
scope and focus of such strategies towards an improved regulatory contribution 
to (among others, sustainable) innovation and growth. Especially 
the references by Gunningham et al. to ‘regulatory design processes’, 
‘regulatory principles’ and ‘instrument combinations’, hold a promise on 
these counts – even though their proposals seem more focused on framing 
the policy process than providing guidelines for legal design. 
 
Design of regulatory channelling and tilt 
On a more specific note, the institutional take on legal design and smart 
rules & regimes may already provide a relevant analytical tool to elaborate 
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methodically on the concept presented in the first paragraph and based on 
Brownsword’s notion of a ‘regulatory range’ or of ‘regulatory channelling’. 
Applied to (especially fostering) technological innovation, we should, as a 
matter of legal design, be able to express such regulatory strategies (including 
reservations, facilitation and tilt) in terms of the squares of normative 
oppositions (command, prohibition, permission and dispensation), and 
the contrary, contradictory, subcontrary and subaltern relations between 
rules fitting to these strategies. Thus a methodologically more sophisticated 
perspective seems feasible on the possibilities of design rules and regimes 
that express regulatory strategies becoming technological innovations. 
 
Summing up 
So, our quest continues. It will address both the general scope for a legal 
design methodology and the specific angle of regulating innovation. As 
to the latter, focal points of a design methodology of smart rules and 
regimes should be, on the one hand, determining design guidelines 
with respect to adaptability and ergonomics of rules and regimes, and 
on the other hand, guidelines concerning mixing of legal instruments 
as the challenge of building optimal legal regimes, as regards technological 
innovation and in keeping with maxims of legitimacy, legal 
validity, effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Notes 
1. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid. Available at http://www. 
wrr.nl/english/. Accessed on 25 September 2011. 
2. Especially basic requirements (e.g. legal certainty and trust through a basic 
legal infrastructure) and avoidance of institutional barriers (e.g. technical 
standards). 
3. Expected to trigger, as did the examples mentioned, many other innovations 
and thus contribute significantly to (economic) welfare. 
4. This fragmentation links with the economic concept of anti-commons: a 
fragmented pattern of many holders of rights in (scarce) resources (i.e. government 
powers) each of which is potentially prohibitive for pushing ahead with 
an innovative project, thus causing underuse of the resource (Heller, 1998). 
5. Brownsword (2008: 15) also refers to the work by Murray and Scott (2002) 
in which three dimensions of regulation are distinguished: goal/rule/norm; 
monitoring; behaviour modification (Murray and Scott, 2002: 500–5). 
6. We use the distinction in regulatory modes as presented by Murray and Scott 
(2002: 500–5) – following especially earlier work by Lessig. 
7. Subsidies, loans, securities and tradable allowances, also fall within this 
group, but these – generally – belong to ‘facilitative regulation’, whereas here 
the focus lies on more compelling instruments, such as taxes. In practice, of 
course, all these instruments may be either more facilitative or more compelling, 
depending upon specific circumstances and individual preferences. 
8. Also referred to as ‘design built’ or ‘architectural’ control or regulation 
(Murray and Scott, 2002), for example, artefacts, machines, products, 
services, production processes and infrastructures. 
9. We take the view here that legal bindingness (based upon validity) is the 
default presumption, but does not exclude the possibility of mere moral 
bindingness. 
10. This definition includes elements as presented by Levi-Faur (2010: 20). 
11. This term will be explained in the below (see variables and maxims). 
12. And of course these cases may be combined as often technological innovation 
leads to societal innovation. 
13. ‘Vertical’ as in multi-level regulation; ‘horizontal’ as in multi-actor regulation; 
‘diagonal’ as in problem-based cross-cutting horizontal and vertical 
(comp. Osofsky, 2009). 
14. Within these ‘institutional environments’ different ‘governance structures’ 
define the state of play (i.e. organise transactions), such as contracts and 
firms on markets, cooperation within networks, administrative acts within 
hierarchy. Note that in institutional economics ‘hierarchy’ may refer to the 
governance structure of government but also to that of a firm (which is, 
internally, organised hierarchically) (See van Genugten, 2008). 
15. Note that all three notions of legitimacy imply ‘accountability’, either 
democratically (as in the joint adages: ‘no power without accountability’ 
and ‘no accountability without power’), in a meeting of supply and demand 
(through a barter involving an exchange of information), and in reciprocal 
activity (towards a shared/common objective). 
16. Notions of political philosophy are clearly relevant (as is the concept of good 
legal governance), but only in as much captured within the legal framework 
(of the rule of law) – such as in ‘democracy under the rule of law’. 
17. The term ‘likeliness’ is used to depict that often, in practice, situations 
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arise which do not allow for a ready or immediate judgment in terms of 
lawfulness – i.e. there is no consensus to that effect – and so a ‘digital’ legal 
qualification (i.e. lawful or unlawful) of a contested act or state of affairs is 
(for the time being) ‘indeterminate’ (and possibly subject to propositions 
and hypotheses, based upon doctrinal legal theory). 
18. The importance of a good proxy may point at two different aspects: 1. the 
best description of the desired kind of behaviour (given that regulation is 
necessarily abstract and porous/underdetermined) – for example, ‘establishment’ 
as a forbidden industrial activity unless permitted (matching norm 
(output) and possible factual conduct (as outcome)); 2. the best behavioural 
mode considering the relevant public interest (given that this interest may 
be served by different kinds of behaviour) – for example, provisions prescribing 
targets versus prescribing use of certain means in curbing pollution 
by industrial emissions (matching outcomes in conduct with outcome in 
fostering the public interest). 
19. Conduciveness is fostered by positive incentives, such as conviction (i.e. 
‘the right thing to do’) or greater efficiency (i.e. less costs or more gains/ 
profits for norm-addressees – e.g. tradable allowances) so as to align private 
behaviour to public interests. 
20. Compare: ‘Y shall not do X’, as in ‘X = killing or stealing’ (categorical prohibition); 
‘Y shall not do X when Z, as in ‘X = drive a car without lights on’ 
and ‘Z = after sunset’ (hypothetical prohibition). 
21. For example (1) by prohibiting pollution of ‘type X’, producers shift to or 
increase their pollution of ‘type Y’ – possibly even more detrimental to the 
environment as the relevant public interest. For example (2) negative side 
effects on an adjacent public interest: environmental norms which lead 
to practices that jeopardise safety in the workplace. Of course, trade-offs 
between different public interests are often unavoidable. 
22. The ‘smart bomb’ metaphor describes a bomb smart enough to redirect itself. 
Mainly to be able to hit a moving target, but possibly also to ensure that no 
unnecessary (‘collateral’) harm is inflicted (i.e. to other objects/subjects than 
intended). 
23. In turn this relates to the distinction between transaction costs and production 
costs (and effects), upon which this contribution shall not elaborate. 
Consider though, as an example, establishing or adjusting a chemical plant 
in accordance with new emission norms, to operate subsequently profitably 
also by selling redundant emission capacity. 
24. The IEA (International Ergonomics Association) defines ‘ergonomics’ (or 
‘human factors’) as ‘the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding 
of interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the 
profession that applies theory, principles, data and methods to design in order 
to optimise human well-being and overall system performance. (IAE website 
[retrieved 27 February 2011]: http://iea.cc/.) The work of ergonomists is, again 
according to the IEA, concerned with ‘the analysis of human-system interaction 
and the design of the system in order to optimise human well-being 
and overall system performance’. The analogy, of course, is the ‘fit’ between 
norm-addressees and regulation, and the ambition of optimally balancing 
‘norm-addressees well-being’ and ‘overall regulatory system performance’. 
25. This point is also addressed in the ‘Better Regulation’/‘Smart Regulation’ 
debate – see the references in the conclusion of this chapter. 
26. Compare Sharpf’s analyses on ‘output-legitimacy’ (Scharpf, 1999). 
27. See endnote 14 on these ‘institutional environments’. Furthermore, we will 
not go into the nature of this game in terms of being a ‘(non) zero- sumgame’. 
28. So far published only as pre-publications on the LEGS website (http://www. 
utwente.nl/mb/legs/), but to be published in the near future (for reference 
see LEGS website). 
29. To also write ‘type’ in italics is my personal choice, as it refers to a generalised 
perspective on the function-form relationship and the possibility of 
multiple use of the design (in cases where the same boundaries apply). 
30. And not otherwise, such as, mean and lean, ‘copy-paste’ strategies, with only 
minor amendments (on dates, names, objects …). Thus existing legal artefacts 
are used as a design-form for other artefacts of a similar type. Merely 
applying a form(at) does not amount to design, especially if it lacks the 
reflection on methodological accurateness of this de facto design for the 
functionality of the specific object of creation. 
31. Quoted almost literally (Ruiter, 2010c: 10). 
32. The latter component is not relevant in categorical norms – at least not in 
terms of a legal constraint. 
33. Creation implies the possibility of changing. 
34. Consider, for example, how framing a conjunction of a (simultaneous) permission 
(‘may do x’) and an exemption (‘may not do x’), which amounts 
to ‘freedom’ (‘to do or not to do x’), may be regarded as a norm (as a strong 
or positive permission/exemption) or as absence of a norm (no prohibition 
and no command – a weak or negative permission) (von Wright, 1963: 86; 
Ruiter, 2010c: 2). Of course, such conjunctions may also be applied in the 
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design of legal rights, according to the Hohfeld squares of legal relations. 
 
References 
-Baldwin, R., ‘Is better regulation smarter regulation?’, Public Law, (2005), 
pp. 485–511. 
-Brownsword, R. Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
- European Commission, Simplifying and improving the regulatory environment 
(Action Plan on Better Regulation), Com (2002) 278 final, Brussels, June 2002. 
- European Commission, Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, 
COM (2005) 97, Brussels, March 2005. 
- European Commission, Smart Regulation in the European Union, COM (2010) 543 
final, Brussels, November 2010. 
- Genugten, M. L. van, The Art of Alignment: Transaction Cost Economics and the 
Provision of Public Services at the Local level (Dissertation, University of Twente, 
2008). 
- Gunningham, N. and D. Sinclair, Designing Smart Regulation, OECD web publication, 
1997. Available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/39/33947759.pdf. 
Accessed on 25 September 2011. 
- Gunningham, N., P. Graboski and D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation. Designing 
Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
- Heldeweg, M. A., Smart Rules & Regimes. Publiekrechtelijk(e) ontwerpen voor privatisering 
en technologische innovatie (Elaborated inaugural lecture, Enschede, 
University of Twente 2010). 
- Heller, M., ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons’, Harvard Law Review, vol. 1 (1998). 
- Klink, B. van, and C. Prins, Law and Regulation. Scenarios for the Information Age 
(Informatization Developments and the Public Sector Nr. 7), (Amsterdam: IOS 
Press, 2002). 
- Levi-Faur, D., ‘Regulation & Regulatory Governance’, Jerusalem Papers in 
Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 1, February 2010. 
- Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation, Final Report (on Better Regulation), 
13 November 2001. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_ 
regulation/documents/mandelkern_report. pdf. Accessed on 25 September 
2011. 
- Murray, A. and C. Scott, ‘Controlling the new media: hybrid responses to new 
forms of power’, Modern Law Review, (2002), p. 491. 
- OECD, From Red Tape to Smart Tape (Paris: OECD, 2003). 
- OECD, OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance (OECD, 
2005). 
- OECD, Economic Surveys, Netherlands (Paris: OECD, 2006) 
- Osofsky, H. M., ‘Is climate change ‘International’? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory 
Role’, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 29 (2009) no. 3, pp. 585–650. 
- Rittel, H. and M. Webber, ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’, Policy 
Sciences, vol. 4 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc., 
1973). Reprinted in N. Cross (ed.), Developments in Design Methodology 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1984). 
- Ruiter, D. W. P., Institutional Legal Facts, Legal Powers and their Effects (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). 
- Ruiter, D. W. P., Legal Institutions (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). 
- Ruiter, D. W. P., ‘Four Legal Methodology Papers’ (a. A Methodology of Legal 
Design; b. A Methodology of Legal Institutional Design; c. A Methodology of Design 
of Legal Norms of Conduct; d. A Methodology of Design of Power Conferring Legal 
Norms; e. A Methodology of Legal Acts), working papers, University of Twente, 
2010 (a–e). Forthcoming (at http://www.utwente.nl/mb/legs/). 
- Ruiter, D. W. P., ‘Calabresi and Melamed’s entitlements: a Hohfeldian approach 
to ‘The Cathedral’, in M. L. van Genugten and M. Harmsen (eds), De vorm 
behouden, verslag van een levenswerk door Dick W. P. Ruiter (Enschede: University 
of Twente, 2008), pp. 61–87. 
- Scharpf, F.W., Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
- Scott, C., ‘Regulatory governance and the challenge of constitutionalism’, EUI 
Working Papers (RSCAS 2010/07), Robert Schuman Centre for advanced studies, 
Private regulation Series-02, 2010. 
- Somsen, H., ‘Rechtvaardige en doelmatige regulering van medische biotechnologie: 
embryoselectie en biobanken’, in H. Somsen, J. Bovenberg, and B. van 
Beers (eds), Humane biotechnologie en recht (Deventer: Preadviezen NJV, 2009). 
- Tiebout, C., ‘A pure theory of local expenditure’, Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 64 (1956) no. 5, pp. 416–24. 
- Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), Het borgen van het 
publiek belang. Rapporten aan de regering nr. 56, 2000 (ISBN 901209058x). 
- Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR) Innovatie vernieuwd. 
Opening in viervoud. WRR rapport nr. 80, Amsterdam University Press 2008 (the 
WRR website, see endnotes, also includes a summary in English: Innovation 
Renewed). 
- Wright, G. H. von, Norm and Action (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).	  
